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Abstract  
 
 
Renewed attention is being paid to the quality of qualitative research in studies of 
development impact in the wake of intense debate over the role of randomised control 
trials.   These debates raised the bar over quality while also provoking concerns about whose 
voices matter and the politics of evidence-based policy making.   This paper argues that both 
of these issues can be addressed through Guba and Lincoln’s trustworthiness criteria, and 
particularly the principle of authenticity which was developed to respond to demands for 
research to be transformative and emancipatory.  Adopting these criteria in commissioned 
evaluations as checklist ‘artefacts’ are a means to improve rigour and raise ethical standards.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Renewed attention is now being paid to the role of qualitative methods in evaluations of the 
impact of development policies and interventions.  This arises in the wake of a decade of 
intense debate in the development sector over the “experimentalist surge” (Picciotto 2014) 
of randomised control trials (RCTs).  These have been used in a wide range of sectoral 
interventions ranging from education to agriculture, financial services to political 
empowerment, with results claimed to be the basis for evidence-based policy making.  Their 
claim to be the ‘gold standard’ of rigour has raised the bar the use of qualitative methods in 
impact research.  The white heat of this debate is now waning amidst claims that  RCTs are 
“off the gold standard” and with calls for the debate to be refocussed on the core functions 
and purposes of impact evaluation and for the deployment of “relevant rigour”  which is 
argued to require negotiation (Camfield and Duvendack 2014, Guijt and Roche 2014).  
Moreover, the narrow view of RCTs as evidence for policy making, has provoked an 
important wider concern about its politics.  The question of how such - apparently value-free 
- evidence arises, is critical when development is in fact conceptualised as a transformational 
process based on rights, with politics and power relations at its centre and hence a concern 
for means and not only ends (Eyben and Guijt 2015).   
 
Practically also,  recognition that a huge range of development interventions and policies are 
not evaluable using experimental techniques,  has led to moves to broaden the range of 
methods (Stern, Stame et al. 2012) to incorporate state-of-the-art approaches involving 
theory-based and realist methods, along with ways of making qualitative work rigorous for 
causal inference (White 2009, Stern 2015). These approaches make use of a range of both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence but rely very extensively on qualitative methods.  This 
leads to a broader concern regarding the rigour with which research using qualitative data 
collection and analysis is undertaken (Spencer, et al. 2003).   
 
This paper therefore sets out to consider how rigour in qualitative impact evaluation can be 
better addressed.  According to the Oxford Living English Dictionary, rigour is defined as “the 
quality of being extremely thorough and careful” (OED online, 2017).    Guidelines for 
evaluating the quality of qualitative evaluation have been developed for various contexts 
such as Spencer et al. (2003) for evidence being reviewed in relation to UK government 
policy development, and more recently Santiago-Delefosse (2016) specifically focussed on 
the health sector.  The latter highlights the importance for quality of the core steps of any 
research exercise: starting with clarity over theoretical frameworks; research questions; 
aims and objectives; literature review; methodology and design; sampling; data; analytical 
process; and ethics.  It indicates some consensus on criteria that are more specifically 
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associated with discussion of qualitative research quality: reflexivity, credibility and 
transferability.   
 
These latter criteria of credibility and transferability draw from the language and ideas of 
Guba and Lincoln’s early framework for assessing quality (1981; 1982) which they termed 
trustworthiness.  This offered to the naturalist paradigm a parallel approach to the positivist 
criteria for rigour.  However, this remained unsatisfactory as it remained within the “third 
generation” of evaluation based in the judgement of external actors.  They therefore 
proposed “fourth generation” evaluation underpinned by the principle of authenticity and 
embedded in the constructivist paradigm  (1989).  This principle recognises that all 
judgement and understanding has a value basis and hence is subject to political and 
ideological forces.  The consequence for evaluation is that it must involve negotiation among 
stakeholders so that the basis of their understandings and values is part of the process.  
While their initial position was that third generation evaluation based in a positivist 
perspective could not be mixed (2001) with such fourth generation approaches, their later 
position (2007, p25) recognises that the authenticity principle and its concerns for fairness 
and negotiation were helping to address ethical and ideological problems which “while at 
first appearing to be radical…are nevertheless becoming mainstream”.  However, it is 
notable that the checklists for qualitative research discussed above do not incorporate this 
principle and therefore remain firmly within the domain of third-generation judgement so 
neglecting an overt concern with the politics involved. 
 
This paper is particularly concerned with the extensive body of qualitative research which is 
commissioned by funders to evaluate and establish the impact of their funded policies and 
interventions.  In the context of this renewed focus on rigour  - or reliability - in qualitative 
research for impact assessment , this paper returns to examine the debate over rigour and 
the trustworthiness criteria of Guba and Lincoln as core principles .  We then  review the 
authenticity principle in greater depth to engage with the politics of evaluation by bringing 
in the voices of beneficiaries and stakeholders.  While the underlying thinking is familiar 
within debates over participatory approaches to appraisal and evaluation, and more 
specifically in participatory action research, the scope for explicit participatory approaches in 
commissioned evaluations is usually very limited or - more specifically – not perceived as 
what the commissioner may be seeking.  Indeed these evaluations fit the definition of what 
Macdonald called “bureaucratic” evaluation (Norris 2015). We therefore specifically focus 
on the space for practicing authenticity within such contexts and argue that the time is ripe 
for actively adopting authenticity into checklists of rigour as an evaluation “artefact” which 
can be used for “playing the game to change the rules” (Guijt 2015).    
The paper starts by reviewing the underlying basis of concerns about rigour in qualitative 
research, leading to different views of whether and how it can be addressed.  It introduces 
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Guba and Lincoln’s principles of trustworthiness and then focuses on the transformative-
emancipatory values that the principle of authenticity engages with.  It then discusses the 
scope for practicing these in the organisational context of commissioned research.  The 
paper concludes by discussing the ethical challenges and how the principle might be 
promoted in the development sector by its use as an evaluation “artefact” (Guijt 2015).  
 
 
2. Qualitative research and the ‘problem’ of rigour  
 
The philosophy underlying most qualitative research is that there is no single truth or reality 
and that phenomena depend on our perceptions and interpretations of them. Therefore the 
nature of reality is not unique or objectively verifiable but relative (ontologically relativist) 
and is created by our interpretations of it (epistemologically constructionist / interpretivist / 
or subjective). The “truth” presented is then a result of the interaction and relationship 
between the researcher and the researched rather than simply of the research design, as it 
is constructed by individuals under particular conditions and in a particular context, and 
consequently cannot be generalised (Sandelowski, 1986).  This contrasts with quantitative 
research in which there is an objective reality (ontological realism) driven by natural laws 
which science seeks to discover.  In this casefor investigation - epistemology - the researcher 
and the object of inquiry are separate (duality) therefore the researcher does not influence 
the way this truth is experienced .  Truth is therefore seen as being obtained through 
scientific methods in which theories are proposed, and hypotheses derived from them are 
tested, with the potential for their falsification (Teddie and Tashakkori, 2009) so presenting 
findings or knowledge as generalisable and relevant across time and context.    
 
Although this is a standard way of defining the contrast between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, the field of qualitative research is diverse and expanding with a range of 
approaches and methods such that it involves further debate and disagreement.  Traditions 
range from phenomenology, ethnography, case study, biography, grounded theory,  to 
feminist and Marxist perspectives and so on, in turn having diverse research aims.   
Moreover, how qualitative researchers apply constructionism and/or interpretivism depends 
on what traditions they belong to, and some qualitative traditions can be closer to positivism 
and post-positivism (Racher and Robinson, 2002) in understanding the world as having 
objective reality, while others may differ between the extent to which they seek to 
understand or to bring about a social change (Sandelowski,1986). So a straightforward 
dichotomous understanding of quantitative as being premised on positivist/post-positivist 
paradigm and qualitative on interpretivism is misleading.   
 
With this plurality, and despite the widespread use of qualitative research and contribution 
to understanding, it has faced significant criticism.  In the field of impact evaluation, this 
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criticism was particularly made by Archie Cochrane (1972) now seen as the ‘father’ of 
randomized control trials as the ‘gold standard’ for evidence. He saw qualitative research as 
unscientific and unfit for purpose.   The very features of it that are its strength such as the 
depth and closeness of the researcher to the research topic and to the data  are argued to 
be its weakness due their being subjective and lacking rigour (Morse et al, 2002).   
 
Nevertheless, it is the frequently profound submersion of the researcher with the data 
collection from research participants and context which are its advantages. As Pretty (1995, 
p.40) suggests ‘we can only get a human idea of what is in the world, and so science itself 
can only be a human picture of the world’ and according to Rolfe (2002, p. 91) truth is when 
it ‘rings true’, that is when it resonates with our own experiences’.  Despite this contribution, 
and the counter-arguments by qualitative researchers who point out that quantitative 
research suffers from subjectivism too when it comes to choosing categories and variables 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011),  it is qualitative research that has been put on the back foot from the 
perspective of wider policy discussion and the debate over evidence.  
 
The response from qualitative researchers has been a debate over whether and how rigour 
can in fact be implemented and the question of whether rigour can or should actually be a 
criterion is itself highly contested.  While some take the view that neglecting rigour could 
undermine the whole existence of this paradigm as a systematic science (Morse et al., 2002); 
others argue that it does not need to be discussed at all (Sparkes, 2001).  Moreover, given 
the range of qualitative methodologies there is little agreement as to whether a set of 
criteria needs to be general to all the fields of qualitative research or distinctive to each one 
of them (Sandelowski, 1993).   
 
The debate over criteria involves three positions (Denzin 2011).  First, the foundationalists – 
who take the view that all research can conform to shared criteria (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2003); second, the quasi-foundationalists who argue that a specific set of criteria unique to 
qualitative research is needed (eg. Sandelowski, 1993; Lincoln and Guba, 1985); and finally 
the non-foundationalists who argue that it is understanding rather than prediction that is 
necessary and that ‘inquiry and its evidence is always political and moral’ (Denzin, 2011) and 
therefore that criteria are not appropriate.   
 
For those who consider a set of criteria as useful, one starting point is the quality criteria 
used in quantitative research.  The central ones are internal validity, objectivity, reliability 
and generalization (Bryman, 1988). Internal validity refers to the suitability of a chosen 
method to measure what it is used to measure i.e. the degree to which the results are 
attributable to the independent variable; objectivity is achieved by positioning the 
researcher outside of the measured activity; reliability is when the same results can be 
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achieved using the same methods; generalisation is ensured through using statistical tests to 
control other factors (Hamberg et al., 1994). 
 
A range of quality principles have been developed (Agar, 1986; Guba, 1981; Kirk and Miller, 
1986; Leininger, 1985; Brink, 1991) from which it is evident that there is considerable 
overlap in the nature and language of the criteria being presented as well as some mapping 
onto the quantitative criteria.  Agar’s (1986) credibility, accuracy of representation, and 
authority of the writer are versions of validity and reliability and are close in meaning to the 
two typologies of Guba (1981) and Lincoln and Guba (1985). Guba's (1981) model of four 
aspects of trustworthiness that are relevant to both quantitative and qualitative studies are 
very similar to the one by Lincoln and Guba (1985) except for the principle of authenticity. 
An exception is Kirk and Miller (1986) whose criteria argue for consistency of results and 
stability over time which seems contrary to a qualitative view that interpretations and 
understandings may change over time.  
 
In the literature in this field it is Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria that have become the 
most used and cited with their language of “trustworthiness” rather than rigour also being 
adopted  (see table 2). The comparative advantages of this typology are seen as its relevance 
across qualitative paradigms (Sale and Brazil, 2004) and having the advantage of parsimony 
(Bryman et al., 2008). The typology is the most developed and therefore we use it for the 
conceptual and analytical clarity and depth that it can offer.  
 
3.  Trustworthiness principles 
Table 1 summarises the criteria and we discuss the first four which have been most used in 
practice and turn to the authenticity principle in the next section.  
 
Credibility is argued to be similar to internal validity in quantitative research. Research is 
seen as credible when the researcher has confidence in the truth of the findings with regard 
to the subjects of research and the context where it was conducted. As there is understood 
to be a plurality of truths within the qualitative paradigm, then credibility is about 
‘representing those multiple realities revealed by informants as adequately as possible’ and 
testing those realities against various groups of people (Krefting, 1991; p. 215), so as to draw 
out common themes, actions and issues. The description of realities is important, so that 
people who share similar experiences should recognise them and be able to relate them to 
their own realities (Sandelowski, 1986). Moreover, Sandelowski (1986)  suggests that the 
credibility of qualitative work increases when the researcher discusses his/her own 
behaviour alongside the behaviour of other ‘subjects of research’ and reflects on their 
closeness to the data in order to recognise how she might be unduly giving weight to 
particular positions or interpretations over others when analysing and interpreting it. So the 
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researcher needs to stay close to data but at a reflexive distance from it. This needs to result 
in such an interpretation of data which is recognisable for both the research participants and 
scientific community.  
 
 
Table 1. Lincoln and Guba’s principles for evaluating trustworthiness in qualitative 
research 
Qualitative 
research  
Questions that underpin the principles of 
qualitative research  (Pretty, 1994; p. 42) 
Quantitative 
research concepts 
Credibility  How can we be confident about the 
‘truth’ of the findings? 
Internal validity 
Confirmability  How can we be certain that the findings 
have been determined by the subjects 
and contexts of the inquiry, rather than 
the biases, motivations and perspectives 
of the investigator?  
Objectivity  
Dependability  Would the findings be repeated if the 
inquiry were replicated with the same (or 
similar) subjects in the same or similar 
context? 
Reliability  
Transferability  Can we apply these findings to other 
context or with other groups of people? 
Generalisation  
Authenticity  Have people been changed by the 
process? To what extent did the 
investigation prompt action?  
 
Source:  own table based on Pretty (1994) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
 
 
Confirmability is about ensuring that the research process and findings are not biased, hence 
it refers to both the researcher and the interpretations (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). This raises 
the issue of distance from and influence of the researcher on data collection and analysis 
when the researcher is actively involved with research participants and constantly engages 
with the data. This closeness of the researcher to the object of the study is argued to be a 
unique feature of qualitative data, so it is challenging for the researcher as a ‘positioned 
subject’ (Rosaldo, 1989) to consciously reflect about her own acts and background in 
relation to the data. Confirmability is achieved when the interpretation of data is neutral and 
free from the researcher’s personal bias.    
 
Dependability is to ensure consistent data collection without unnecessary variations to 
ensure repeatability of the research process. This is about being able to trace sources that 
the data comes from and about documenting the data, methods and decisions made during 
the fieldwork. So consistency in the entire research process is key for achieving 
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dependability. This criterion is suggested to be closely linked to credibility and be equally 
important for qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) themselves argue that 
establishing dependability ensures credibility. Although the strategies used to prove these 
two principles can be similar, their meanings are different: credibility is about ‘accurate 
representation of experience while dependability focuses attention on the researcher-as-
instrument and the degree to which interpretation is made in a consistent manner.’ (Baxter 
and Eyles, 1997; p. 517). 
 
Transferability  is similar to external validity or generalisability but is not reached through 
random sampling and probabilistic reasoning. Transferability is when the research 
descriptions and findings are sufficient to draw similarities with another context. To achieve 
this criterion, the researcher needs to provide detailed descriptive information. These details 
should enable the reader to judge the applicability of findings to her own settings. However, 
as discussed, it is hard to generalise meanings constructed from a small group of 
respondents and this is usually not the goal of qualitative research.  Nevertheless, the 
researcher has the (ethical) responsibility to describe the findings in the way that allows 
transferability and let the reader decide whether those meanings are transferrable to her 
context (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 
 
Despite the acknowledged advantages of these criteria, it is unsurprising given the 
paradigmatic disagreements laid out above, that there are criticisms.  The first is that in 
order to argue for absolute trustworthiness it is necessary to take an epistemologically  
positivistic view (Pretty, 1994) rather than that truth is valid for a certain time and a certain 
context and is not static. Therefore, in order to ensure trustworthiness it is suggested that 
the criteria should include the process of inquiry, informing the reader about what has and 
has not happened before, during and after the inquiry (ibid).  
 
In addition, Morse et al. (2002) argue that confirmability is not suitable for phenomenology, 
feminist research and critical theory ‘in which the investigator’s experience becomes part of 
data, and which perceive reality as dynamic and changing’ (p. 19). Smith (1993 in Tobin and 
Begley, 2004) argues that some procedures such as member or dependability checks (in 
which researchers share their conclusions with respondents and get feedback on their 
conclusions) are not appropriate to the philosophical idea of multiple realities that 
qualitative research is based on and therefore, target its fundamental epistemological and 
ontological premise.  
 
As indicated above, the non-foundationalists reject Lincoln and Guba’s criteria out of hand. 
As Barbour (2001) and Morse et al. (2002) claim, any technical solutions reducing qualitative 
research to a list of methodological procedures does not ensure rigour. Barbour (2001) 
argues that such procedures can only be successful if they are conducted within a proper 
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understanding of qualitative research as creative and flexible, which makes it problematic to 
reduce it to what is seen as a box-ticking exercise. Moreover, it is argued that the procedural 
aspects must come second when evaluating the quality of qualitative research after ‘moral 
principles and ethical standards’ of how researchers relate to research participants (Rallis et 
al., 2007). This ethical argument is paramount since qualitative research is based on 
relationships which emerge between the researcher and data, the researcher and research 
participants, data and research participants and the wider circle of readers. Therefore, they 
argue that the trustworthiness of a qualitative study needs to be judged on how ethically it 
is done with relation to research participants, other stakeholders and the scientific 
community. 
 
4. The authenticity principle  
It was in response to these criticisms that Lincoln and Guba added the fifth criterion of 
authenticity in order to more clearly distinguish these principles from positivistic ones 
(Lincoln, 1990 cited in Pretty, 1994).   The authenticity criterion has five elements (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989) and was developed in accordance with a constructivist tradition i.e. 
knowledge is relative to time and place, subjective meanings matter and that ‘…‘truth is a 
matter of consensus among informed and sophisticated constructors…’ (Lay and 
Papadopoulos, 2007; p. 495). 
 
Schwandt et al (2007) argue that authenticity is an extension of the trustworthiness criteria 
because it enables questions to be asked about how interpretations are made and how this 
process has evolved.  Indeed, the authenticity principle recognises that inquiry and 
understanding are a process of learning, changing, negotiating and ultimately acting. 
Qualitative research affects the consciousness of the researcher and research participants to 
the extent that it can change the way they understand the truth(s). For the authenticity 
principle, the evaluation research should recognise and promote the diversity of the value 
systems and people’s constructions of the world which change constantly as people interact 
with one another. Therefore the principle takes into account the process of forming 
interpretations from the value-point of respondents, their voice, their diversity, their 
positioning and empowerment towards other respondents and themselves. In this process, 
research participants as well as researchers learn to respect each other, to see the issues 
from different perspectives and consequently, negotiate the construction of truth.  Based on 
a constructivist epistemology, the main drive for the authenticity principle is negotiation i.e. 
negotiation of constructs and values. Guba and Lincoln (2001) suggest that such an approach 
to the evaluation can deal with the conventional problems with evaluations which, among 
other weaknesses, favours the point of view of the funder, which is disempowering, unfair 
to other stakeholders, and fails to accommodate value-pluralism, and is overcommitted to 
the positivist paradigm of inquiry. 
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Table 2 gives the summary of the five criteria of authenticity including their short definitions. 
The assumptions behind the authenticity principle are that people and groups have different 
value systems which affect their constructions and the five dimensions seek to expose the 
ways in which these have been sought out and developed through the research process.  
First is fairness which they say involves a core dimension of balance.  This means making 
sure that different constructions emerge, and so allowing conflicting constructions and value 
structures to be expressed . This therefore means that the researcher must actively observe 
and seek these out and that this then leads into open and active negotiation around the 
agenda for action.    
 
The second two dimensions consider the ways in which participant’s and stakeholder’s 
‘conscious experiencing of the world’ (Guba and Lincoln cited in Schwandt, Lincoln, and 
Guba 2007, p. 22) develops and their constructions change as they gain experience and 
interact with others.   The second dimension of ontological authenticity captures the way 
that the experience affects research participant’s own understanding of the phenomenon 
under scrutiny . This arises as the process of enquiry itself exposes their own views and 
understandings in ways that offer new perspectives and can be captured through their own 
testimonies of these changes.  The third dimension captures the idea that it is not only their 
own understanding that changes but also their appreciation of how other’s view the world:  
what Guba and Lincoln term educative authenticity.  So allowing greater appreciation of 
different opinions, judgments, and actions.  
 
The fourth dimension of catalytic authenticity is defined as the extent to which action is 
stimulated and facilitated by the evaluation.  It captures the idea that the change in 
understanding of one’s own and other’s perspectives has the potential to lead to new 
action: actions which derive from the potential for negotiation over tensions and 
contradictions.    They comment that this is usually lacking at the level of participants and 
stakeholders, rather it being centralised through processes of consolidation and 
dissemination.   
 
Finally, the criterion of tactical authenticity evaluates the extent to which individuals are in 
fact empowered to take the action that this new understanding involves and in relation to 
the final negotiated agenda for action.    
 
For all these components of the authenticity principle to be achieved, negotiation is 
essential and it is achieving consensus that drives the principle. The principles therefore 
respond to the concerns of the non-foundationalists and critical theorists that research in 
itself has political and moral dynamics whose purpose may be to affect the world and not 
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simply to represent it in objective ways.  They affect the world by changing understanding 
with the potential to lead to action.   
 
In the context of the assessment of the impact of development interventions this principle 
therefore makes central the issue of the rights of those affected by a policy or intervention 
to be engaged in the research and to engage with other policy stakeholders in negotiation 
over findings and implications.  Indeed, as Guba (1987; p. 39) suggests authentic evaluation 
will ‘…essentially be about the process of negotiation with and among stakeholders, and that 
the product of evaluation is not ‘…a series of conclusions and recommendations, but as an 
agenda for further negotiation’ (emphasis in original).   The principle therefore particularly 
responds to the recent concerns raised regarding the politics of evidence in development 
and fears that the dominance of experimentalist approaches has become increasingly 
hegemonic in the practices and processes of the allocation of aid resources (Eyben and Guijt 
2015).  We therefore explore further the potential for its use in the context of commissioned 
evaluations.   
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Table 2. The authenticity principle and strategies to achieve it 
 
Source:  Authors’ own table based on  Guba and Lincoln, 1989;  Onwuegbuzie, Leech, & Collins, 2008. . 
Criteria  Definition (Guba and Lincoln, 1989) Strategies to achieve and evidence authenticity  
Fairness The extent to which all competing 
constructions have been accessed, 
exposed, and taken into account in the 
evaluation report, that is, in the 
negotiated emergent construction. 
Observing contradictions and tensions among constructions of stakeholders  
Negotiating these contradictions and tensions and establishing an ‘agenda for subsequent action’ 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 246). 
Ontological 
Authenticity 
(world around)  
The extent to which individual’s 
constructions (including those of the 
evaluator) have become more informed 
and sophisticated 
Analyzing statements (e.g., testimonies) provided by the research participants and leaving audit trails 
that document the participant’s growth in consciousness and understanding of the world, as well as 
the growth in the researcher’s own ‘progressive subjectivity’ (p. 248).  
Observing the participants in action for collecting evidence of an elevation in the participant’s 
consciousness level. 
Educative 
authenticity 
(other people’s 
constructions)  
The extent to which individuals 
(including the evaluator) have become 
more understanding (even if not more 
tolerant) 
of the constructions of others. 
Analyzing statements (e.g., testimonies) provided by the research participants and leaving audit trails 
that document the participant’s growth in understanding of and appreciation for [but not necessarily 
agreement of] the constructions of others outside their stakeholding group are enhanced” Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989, p. 248, italics in original). 
Catalytic 
authenticity  
The extent to which action (clarifying 
the focus at issue, moving to eliminate 
or ameliorate problems, sharpening 
values) is 
stimulated and facilitated by the 
evaluation. 
Obtaining testimony from all participants and stakeholders regarding their interest in and willingness 
to turn their increased understanding into action.  
Obtaining testimony regarding the joint actions of participants who have come to resolutions 
stemming from negotiations of tensions invoked by contesting and contradictory constructions of the 
stakeholders’ (Onwuegbuzie, Leech, & Collins, 2008, p. 9).  
Assessing the extent to which the actions that stemmed from the increased understandings that 
emerged during the course of the study actually occurred 
Tactical 
authenticity  
The extent to which individuals are 
empowered to take the action that the 
evaluation implies or proposes 
Obtaining testimony from all the participants and stakeholders regarding whether/ how the emergent 
feelings of empowerment evolved and manifested themselves 
Systematically following up within a predetermined time frame to assess which participants and/or 
groups acted on their increased feelings of empowerment, and what actions came to the fore 
Researcher and participants (jointly) assess the degree of empowerment that evolved during the 
study. 
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5.  Practicing authenticity 
 
The authenticity principle gives considerable weight to the ability of evaluation research to 
incorporate the values and constructions of participants as well as empowering them to 
improve their situations. Such intentions are of course not without problems when it comes 
to practice.  In the development field there has been a long discussion of participation in 
both development practice  (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Hickey and Mohan 2004) and research 
(Chambers 2004) which have highlighted the core problems of structural power dynamics in 
attempts to involve participants in empowering ways.  In the context of commissioned 
evaluations, evaluators are usually employed for their independence and even where they 
are able to involve a wide range of local stakeholders, often operate in the field with 
virtually no involvement of the commissioners themselves.  Hence, the space for affecting 
commissioners own constructions of the reality of the intervention is often extremely 
limited or indeed non-existent. 
 
Additionally the practical context of most of commissioned evaluations stand largely outside 
a participatory paradigm that would most effectively respond to these concerns.  There are 
real practical challenges regarding the amount of time spent in the field together with 
research participants and the ability to develop effective relationships with them such that 
these objectives can be achieved.  While one-off interviews or group discussions and 
workshops for disseminating research findings can engage new thinking and help inform, 
they clearly fall short of this vision and rarely focus on participants and stakeholders 
becoming enlightened about each other’s values and constructions. This makes it less likely 
that the research would be able to generate far reaching impact on research participants to 
fulfil the authenticity principle. More realistic would be to assume that it is rather the 
researchers or evaluators who would be more likely to experience changes in understanding 
during the course of the study. Moreover, it is hard to foresee that any change would be 
sustainable enough to lead to catalysed action. 
 
While the authenticity principle promotes recognition of the diversity of values and 
constructions, it is unclear how exactly consensus is to be reached or how disagreements are 
dealt with. There will always be power relations among different research groups of 
participants and stakeholders.. Indeed, qualitative research in international development 
evaluation rarely seeks to act as a solution provider, consensus builder or producer of 
tangible action.  It is issues such as these that approaches to evaluation ranging from 
empowerment (Fetterman and Wandersman 2012) to participatory (Coghlan and King 2005) 
and democratic evaluation traditions (House and Howe 2000, MacDonald and Kushner 2005) 
endeavour to manage through specific ways of conducting them.   
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However, with this somewhat pessimistic assessment, the point here is to ask how far these 
aspects can be taken in the context of commissioned assessments that are constrained by 
bureaucratic requirements?  The point is to find ways that consultants undertaking 
commissioned evaluations can exercise their agency within these processes to raise the bar.      
 
At the moment, the strategies suggested in Table 2 represent a range of rather ideal 
approaches for achieving such ethically complex ideas as participation and empowerment.  
In this sense, while the authenticity principle speaks to an important normative concern that 
research be undertaken in a transformative-emancipatory way, the principle needs to bring 
into view the wider research context and practical organisational framework for 
implementing its strategies.  It is these wider dynamics that have been at the core of recent 
concern about the dominance of RCTs in the evidence-based movement and how it meets 
visions of development based in rights-based approaches and the transformation of power 
relations (Eyben and Guijt 2015).   
 
Indeed, engaging with an evaluation assessment in order to open up the space for debate 
and learning is potentially dangerous terrain for participants and raises the possibility of 
extremely unsatisfactory or even dangerous processes of engagement to result.  This may 
be, at a minimum, by wasting the time of participants in processes whose potential for 
producing change is virtually non-existent or extremely marginal.  Moreover, in the context 
of power relations surrounding the implementation of policies or programmes, the result 
may be even more problematic with the potential for negative consequences if findings lead 
to decisions and action that detrimentally rebounds on them.  This could be the withdrawal 
of resources or worse, the potential for victimisation if particular actors feel aggrieved at 
information revealed during evaluation processes. These issues raise in a specific way the 
questions of what have been called “macro-ethical issues” which go beyond the “micro-
ethical issues” of consent, anonymity and so on.  This concern is systemic towards how 
evaluation relates to society and social processes more broadly; whose interests it serves; its 
role in deliberation and the use of evidence and in public sector management and wider 
public debate (Barnett and Munslow 2014):13). Indeed it also raises the question of how 
development is done and the contribution of evaluation to ethical development (Barnett 
and Munslow 2014). While in principle therefore, authenticity incorporates some aspects of 
concern around the politics and power dynamics of impact evaluation, strategies for 
implementation are obviously much more difficult. This discussion therefore highlights the 
need for a wider ethical framework within which the authenticity principle must operate at 
two levels: the individual study and commissioning organisation itself, and, second, the 
wider institutional context of evaluation practice.   
 
For commissioned researchers, guidelines and procedural measures cannot fully mould their 
actions and they are largely driven by their own values and ethics in the context of 
15 
 
operational practical and structural constraints. Ethics are particularly important as 
researchers and evaluators (especially commissioners) tend to have resources and power 
concentrated in their hands, such that the scope for negotiation that can take place in the 
course of a study, is likely to be extremely constrained by its design from the outset.   
Therefore, the issue of ethics is one that extends well beyond procedural ethical 
requirements such as consent.   From the view of the authenticity principle it means that the 
researcher must be fair in allowing a diversity of constructions and values to be expressed, 
she must actively seek to become more informed of her own as well as other people’s 
constructions through reflexivity, and encourage the right actions towards the phenomenon 
by generating trustworthy and ethical qualitative findings.   
 
Going further to create space for the practice of negotiation as part of the practical 
strategies can obviously be of value under the right circumstances.  It can legitimate space 
for diversity of views within the evaluation in the context of problematic top-down power 
relations and in principle requires space for negotiation with commissioners themselves.  
How then can this be done? 
 
As Guijt (2015) argues, it is necessary to “play the game to change the rules” in part by using 
the “artefacts” of evaluation themselves.  That is, the processes, mechanisms and tools that 
are deployed in this field.  It is necessary to understand them, “reframe” and “intelligently 
adopt them” (p200).  We therefore propose that commissioned researchers deploy 
checklists for rigour in this way.  That they include the authenticity principle as a means of 
raising the game with commissioners as to what is appropriate and ethical in the conduct of 
evaluation research and seek to make more space for engagement, negotiation and action.  
While we recognise that a list of strategies is not ideal if it is solely treated in the spirit of box 
ticking – including them can create space for those researchers and commissioned 
organisations who do indeed wish to add value and undertake qualitative research for 
assessing impact in a more progressive way.  So that while it is not possible to up-end power 
relations at a single turn, it is certainly the case that demonstrating a concern for these 
ethical dimensions and their practice can help confirm and give space for reflexivity over the 
intention of the exercise. This in turn calls for the practices of commissioning organisations 
to respond in terms of their own guidelines and checklists.  
 
Table 3. A principle of authenticity and initial strategies to achieve it 
Principle Stages of 
implem-
entation  
Strategies to achieve 
the principle  
Purposes of strategies  
Authenticity 
(negotiation 
over 
Design  Purposeful sampling To have a wide ‘representation’ of 
people who have ‘relevant’ 
relationship with the phenomenon   
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constructions 
through 
diversity of 
views ) 
 
  
Enabling space for 
voice and negotiation 
of potential directions 
of the research  
To include the views of research 
participants on the research design 
e.g. to identify hard to access 
respondents, to be responsive to the 
local mechanisms of consensus 
building and negotiation   
Data 
collect-
ion  and 
analysis 
Making space for a 
wide group of research 
participants to 
participate in data 
collection and analysis 
To draw out diverse views and 
experiences of the phenomenon 
among research participants and 
negotiate the articulation of findings  
with them 
 Dissemin
-ation 
and 
follow up   
Offering means 
through which 
research participants 
can be engaged with 
commissioners as 
stakeholders in making 
recommendations and 
taking follow up 
actions  
To make sure that research 
participants have their ‘say’ in 
recommending any changes to the 
intervention and taking part in their 
follow up. Any recommendations 
should be responsive to the diversity 
of values and opinions of research 
participants   
 Review  Re-visiting 
commissioners, 
stakeholders and 
respondents to assess 
what has changed.  
To establish how the evaluation has 
been used and examine what changes 
in understanding and action were 
achieved by all parties involved.   
 
As a starting point then the orientation is to find ways (see Table 3) for:  (i) making space for 
voice and negotiation by research participants as stakeholders within the design and 
conduct of the research through meetings and workshops and ensuring these involve 
excellent facilitation skills; (ii) finding ways to make space for participation in data collection 
and analysis; (iii) offer means through which representatives of these views can be engaged 
with commissioners in later stages of the evaluation.  Indeed, as an aspiration, getting 
commissioners themselves actively involved in more transparent negotiations with 
participants and other stakeholders over action and outcomes would be a key achievement.   
 
All of these steps must involve ethical considerations regarding the potential for harm. In 
this context, the minimum standard is always to have considered the issues against the 
checklist and explained why the approach taken is appropriate within the resources 
available and how it avoids potential harm.  Table 3 presents a starting checklist for 
orienting research to use the authenticity principle.  
 
The final point in Table 3, addresses the question of what ultimately changed both in terms 
of understanding of the issues and the actions of commissioners and stakeholders.  This 
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effectively means a further review.  In many programme areas this is in fact possible since 
there are frequently follow on programmes whose planning stages could deploy a review 
approach, but of course it is rarely done.  Commissioners usually start again and do not wish 
to revisit past programmes or projects, especially if these were not perceived to be 
‘successful’.   
 
Of course checklists themselves guarantee very little and to achieve change they have to be 
underpinned by a particular mind-set and ethics (Barbour 2001).   This mind-set is an 
orientation underpinned by a concern for ethical practice at both the “micro” and “macro” 
levels oriented towards inclusion, negotiation and deliberation.    It is this orientation that 
underpins the question of “how much?” of any of these strategies is appropriate.  There is 
always space for more to be done and it is constant reflexivity on these issues that is 
required which in development involves constant concern for the dynamics of power 
relations (Groves and Hinton, 2004).    
 
Moreover, organizational culture is also vital for the effective use of checklists. Indeed it is 
the process of arriving at a checklist within a discussion of practice that is most likely to bring 
about change in organisational  - and indeed industry wide - practice (Bosk, Dixon-Woods et 
al. 2009).   Nevertheless, the adoption of checklists does offer a minimum standard which is 
to have considered the issues against the checklist and explained why the approach taken is 
appropriate within the resources available and for the avoidance of potential harm.   
 
More broadly, checklists can act to raise the issues for debate.  For consultants, the use of 
checklists of rigour, and indication of how they are to be applied, can be used to raise the 
understanding of quality in their tenders.  Moving beyond this, the principle of authenticity 
demands the creation of space for learning among all stakeholders, for interaction and 
negotiation.  This means experimenting with approaches to expand the scope for 
authenticity and engaging with commissioners over the processes and resources involved.  
We argue that the time is ripe for actively adopting it into checklists of rigour as an 
evaluation “artefact” as a step towards “play(ing) the game to change the rules” (Guijt 
2015).    
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has been motivated by the recent call for qualitative research used to assess the 
impact of development interventions to address the concern for rigour in the context of 
debates about the politics of evidence.  The paper has therefore reviewed the literature on 
rigour in qualitative research, starting with a review of the underlying philosophical basis to 
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explain the disagreements within the debate between qualitative methodologists 
themselves over the feasibility of rigour.   
 
Notwithstanding these problems, considerable efforts have been made to develop 
standardised criteria for evaluating rigour and the context of impact evaluation research is 
sufficiently practical to require them.  This paper returned to Guba and Lincoln’s framework 
for trustworthiness for the reason that it is the most developed and used and is appropriate 
to the context of much impact assessment research - particularly that in development 
consultancy - which operates within a post-positivist paradigm of realist ontology and 
modified objectivist epistemology where qualitative methodologies and evidence are still 
assessed through criteria of representation and objectivity.   
 
We focused in more detail on the often over-looked principle of authenticity.  Authenticity is 
embedded in concerns of the constructivist camp for research that is transformative-
emancipatory in orientation, and fits well with concerns in evaluation about the politics of 
evidence and the wider macro-ethical concerns as to the role of evaluation in society more 
broadly.  In order to move forward practically we propose that adding authenticity to 
checklists of rigour is therefore a strategic and useful way to deploy the “artefacts” of 
evaluation protocols and guidelines to demonstrate approaches to rigour to commissioners.  
At the same time there is the potential to use this approach to challenge the commissioners 
and institutional frameworks surrounding evaluation itself.  
 
Given the concern that checklists themselves are inadequate, we argue that using such a 
principle requires an orientation to better practice with these ethical concerns at their 
source.  It is this orientation that underpins the question of “how much?” of any of these 
strategies is appropriate.  There is always space for more to be done and it is constant 
reflexivity on these issues that is required.  The minimum standard is always to have 
considered the issues against the checklist and explained why the approach taken is 
appropriate within the resources available and the avoidance of potential harm.  Moving 
beyond this, the principle of authenticity demands the creation of space for learning among 
all stakeholders, for interaction and negotiation.  This means experimenting with approaches 
to expand the scope for authenticity and engaging with commissioners over the processes 
and resources required.   
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